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:. IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
O:F THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN C. DAVIS, .Attorney at Law, 
for himself and all other duly 
licensed and active practicing at-
torneys and counselors at law, simi-
larly situated, ''cithin the State of 
Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OGDEX CITY, UTAH, a Municipal 
Corporation, and CLYDE M. WEB-
BER, Ogden City Recorder, -
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 7241 
Ogden City, a municipal corporation, through . its 
Board of Commissioners, on April 15th last adopted an 
ordinance, herein complained of, which was published, 
and by its terms became effective April_ 17th, 1948. The 
ordinance pur,ports to levy a tax upon those practicing 
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l~w in that. city, as well as upon many other occupations. 
The plaintiff is an attorney at law, who has been duly 
licensed to practice as such and who has complied with 
all the prerequisites imposed by the laws of Utah upon 
those who wish to practice that profession. 
The action is brought both for himself and on be-
half of all others similarly situated, to obtain the per-
emptory writ of this Court restraining the City of Ogden 
from enforcing its ordinance so far as the same has ap~ 
plic·ation to plaintiff and such other lawyers as are af-
fected thereby. The alternative writ of this Court is-
sued, service thereof has been accepted by the attorney 
for Ogden City, and the matters are heard upon the 
demurrer of the City, and its co-defendant, the City 
Recorder. 
The petition of Mr. Davis sets forth that Ogden 
City has numerous courts, including a division of the 
'United States District Court, there sitting, numerous 
public offices to which lawyers must resort, numerous 
businesses having dealings in many points without Ogden 
City and Weber County, its location, and that many 
lawyers without that City, as well as those maintaining 
offices therein, are interested in the matter before the 
Court.· lt recites that shortly prior to the filing of the 
proceeding in this Court the City, through its police 
department, served notices upon him and other lawyers, 
requiring appearances and· payment of the tax imposed 
by the ordinance within five days from date of that 
service. The ordinance is contended to be invalid, as 
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to members ·of the bar, upon several grounds which will 
be developed in th~") orderly arrangement of this ·brief. 
ARGUl\fENT 
The authority of Ogden City, 'vhich is not a char .. 
tered City, to levy any occupation tax must be derived 
from some express statutory enactment .of the Legisla-
ture. The Statutes of this. State which have application 
to the questions here raised are Sections 15-8-39 and 
15-8-80, Utah Code Annotated 1943. Of these, the first 
is a grant of power to license, tax and regulate certain 
specific occupations and businesses, the practice of the 
learned professions being in no instance included. This 
then has applie.ation solely as disclo~ing the limits of 
the reg·ulatory po,ver of Cities, and as establishing that 
Ogden City has no po,ver to regulate the practice of lavl. 
Section 15-8-80, so far as here pertinent, confers 
authority, so far as the Legislature has constitutional 
power to do so, upon cities to ''raise revenue by levying 
and collecting a license fee or tax on any business within 
the limits of the city. and regulate the same by ordin-
ance,'' such po,ver not being limited by any specific 
enumeration of po,vers contained in any other portions 
of Chapter 8 of Title 15, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
but 'vith the requirement that such taxes shall be uni-
form in respect to the class upon which they are imposed. 
. The ordinance in question, so far as pertinent to 
this proceeding, contains the following provisions: 
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It makes it unlawful to engage in "business" 
within the corporate limits of Ogden City with-
.· out first obtaining the business license provided 
for in the ordinance, to violate any other pro-
vision of or to ·fail to comply with "all of the 
appropriate 1provisions '' of the ordinance, and 
makes any such failure a misdemeanor. (Section 
''1). 
Business, as defined by the ·ordinance, in-
cludes all activities engaged in or caused to be 
engaged in for gain or ·economic profit, ·except 
the service of employees to employers, and is 
further defined as including both the sale of 
·tangible property, and ''the rendering of personal 
services for others fo'r a consideration by any 
·persons engaged in any profession, trade, craft, 
business, occupation or other calling.'' (Section 
20, (a) and (b).) . 
Th·e City Commissioners are given authority 
to revoke any license granted under the orrdin-
ance for violation of any of its provisions by 
the licensee, ''and for such other eause a.s is 
justified in law','. There is nothing further in 
the ordinance which -throws any ·1ight on the 
quoted language. (Section 17). . 
The .ordinance bases the license fee Ujpon 
a sliding· scale, graduated in accordance with 
' 'gross receipts'' which are defined as covering 
all receipts from any business subject to the 
ordinance transacted in the ·city, except certain 
excluded items . such as sales tax collected, re-
ceipts from sales or services rendered the United 
.States, and certain federal taxes collected in con-
ne,~t~pn with sales. (Sections 6, 10 and 19 (c)). 
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Provi8ions looking to,vards enforcement in-
clude the requirement that the license .be eon~ 
spieuously displayed at all places of busines~ 
licensed, (Section 12), the requirement of keep-
ing of books and records accurately reflecting 
gross income and preserving same for four years 
(Section 14), penalties of 10% plus·1% per month 
interest on delinquencies (Section 15), ,p:r;ohib~t:-
ing false returns, (Section 16), power conferred 
upon the City Recorder where ~pplication is not 
filed and fee paid to determine amount of fees 
due, plus penalties and interest, and to enable 
him to so determine the amount due he is given 
access to books, records, inventories, invoices 
and stocks of goods of the licensee, put he may 
fix the sum arbitrarily, since he is not required 
to exercise such power of search, (Section 18). 
Finally in addition to the criminal remedy 
of prosecution, the right to bring civil suit to re·-
cover any sums due is extended, (Sections 1 and 
19). 
STATEMENT OF GRO,UNDS OF C·OMPLAINT 
The ordinance in question is attacked by the peti-
tion upon the grounds that ;-
No. 1: The ;practice of the law is not a business 
within the scope of Sections 15-8-39 or 15-8-80; Utah 
Code Annotated 1943; and 
No. 2: That lawyers, as a class, being licens:ed arid 
regulated by the State, are not subJect to "license_ ·and 
regulation'' hy municipalities; and · ·· · 
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No. 3: That the ordinance is discriminatory in 
that it taxes gross earnings (with some deductions which 
it sets out) of those engaged in a profession or calling 
and employed by the public generally, without taxing 
others, including those of the same profession or calling, 
who receive their remuneration from one or more per-
sons in the form of salary, rather than of fees; and 
No. 4 : That the ordinance, being in the nature of 
one imposing a gross income tax, is in excess of thr 
powers delegated to municipalities; and 
No. 5: That lawyers, as a. class, being a part of 
the judicial branch of the government, are not subject 
to either licensing or regulation by municipalities; and 
No. 6: That the ordinance impairs the rights of 
litigants to be represented by legal counsel of their own 
choice. 
PROPOSITION NO. 1 
The question is presented, does any 8tatute author-
ize imposition by ·a municipality of either a license or 
an occupation tax upon members of the Bar~ 
There is no contrarity of opinion on the question 
of the right of legislatures to grant to municipalities 
the right to regulate the practice of the learned profes-
sions. It is held generally that regulation is the out-
growth of the police power, that it lies in the field :where 
public health, safety or morals justifies interference 
by the public by way of regulation of business to prevent 
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damage to either, and the practice of la'v is not such a 
business. rrhat the Courts, and in the absence of their 
a8sumption of control oYer the field, the Legislature, 
may adopt or pass regulatory rules or laws for the 
Government of the Bar. admission thereto and eject-
ment therefrom, as a condition of :permitting its practice, 
is conceded~ but this does not bring the practice of law 
\Vithin the scope of the poliee power. That regulation 
sounds fundamentally, as we shall see later, in the power 
of Courts oYer those \vho are its officers and in the 
imposition of conditions for such discipline upon those 
to whom the restricted privilege of the practice of law 
is granted. We submit that the books are entirely with-
out example of any case where the regulation of legal 
practice by any legislative body, other than a State 
Legislature, can be found. For examples of cases which 
discuss the necessity of the police ~ower existing to sus-
tain regulation of businesses by municipalities, see: 
City of Sonora vs. Curtin, (Cal.) 70 Pac .. 67 4. 
Hill et al vs. City of Eureka (Cal.) 94 · Pac. 
2nd 1025. 
In re Quong Woo, 13 Fed. 229. 
It is said in the case of the City of Sonora vs. Cur-
tin (supra) on pages 675 and 676, where the question of 
the power of the City to regulate the bar was directly 
involved: 
''There is nothing about the practice of the 
profession of the law which makes the business 
dangerous to the public. It does not threaten 
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to the public. - This ordinance could not have 
been passed under the power to regulate, for it 
is evident that the board of trustees have no 
power to regulate the practice of the law. They 
have no :power to pass upon or inquire into the 
qualifications or character of persons who desire 
to practice la,v, nor to say where or in what 
courts they shall practice. '' 
As we have pointed out, Section 15-8-39, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943, giving power to "license, tax and reg-
ulate'' certain specified occupations does not include the 
learned professions and, we may add, none o£ the many 
sections granting powers over other businesses and oc-
cupations, which may be found in Title 15, Chapter 8 
of the Code of Utah make any reference to the profe8-
sions. If that ~power exists, it must be found under Sec-
tion 15-8-80 of said Code. 'V e contend that it does not 
there exist for two reasons : 
(A). The legislative history of the act discloses 
intent of the legislature not to place the practice of 
the law within the scope of occupation taxes; 
(B). The wording of the statute itself does not 
extend to authorize the levying of occupation taxes upon 
businesses within the regulatory power . 
.As to (.A)-We think this Court has deter1nined the 
right' of taxation of members of the Bar many years ago 
and the legislative situation which it then outlined has 
not been altered since the opinion in that case was 
handed down. The case we refer to is Ogden City v~. 
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Bore1nan, 20 Utah 98, 57 Pac. 843. In that case, Ogden 
City sought to tax by the licensing method those en .. 
gaged in professions in that City, including the defend-
ant, \Vho 'Yas a lawyer. · The decision was against the 
City and \\'"a~ based upon t'vo grounds, being: 
(1) That. a general statute, similar to Section 
15-8-80, as it stood prior to the amendment by 
the 1935 Legislature, did not extend the power of 
the City to license, for revenue purposes as there 
attempted, any business or occupation not enunl-
erated in some specific statute, such as Section 
15-8-39. 
( 2) That the legislative history of licensing 
provisions disclose,d the intent of the Legislature 
to withhold the power to license the legal pro.:. 
fession from Utah municipalities. 
VVe shall not argue here the first of the matters 
decided in that case, since the 1935 Legislature added a 
proviso to Section 15-8-80 which expressly states that 
''no enumeration of po,vers'' contained els-ewhere in 
the chapter defining the 1p,owers of cities ''shall be 
deemed to limit or restrict the general grant of author-
ity hereby conferred.'' But we do contend that the 
other point upon which the Boreman case was decided 
remains applicable to the ordinance in question, and 
that the legislative history there cited still remains ap-
plicable to the matter no'v before this Court. 
It will be remembered that, as s·et out in the Bore-
man decision, . Utah had an expres·s statute re-enacted 
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in the compilation of the 1888 laws, authorizing cities 
to impose license taxes upon lawyers. The same laws 
contained statutes which, with little change, remain as . 
Section 15-8-39 and as S.ection 15-8-80 (with the 1935 
proviso eliminated) of our present Code. In 1898, when 
the revised statutes for that year were enacted, the 
express grant of authority to tax lawyers was re1pealed, 
,the other statutes remaining. This Court said on pages 
844 and 845, in said Boreman case (Pacific citation): 
''A general rule for the construction of stat-
utes is that where a part of an act has been re-
.rpealed, it must, though of no operative force, still 
be taken in construing the rest. - By repealing 
the clause providing for licensing and taxing 
~awyers, and enacting the general clause re-
ferred to, leaving lawyers, and the professions 
generally out of such re-enactment, impels the 
conclusion that the legislature intended to de-
prive the cities of the power to impose a license 
f~e or tax upon lawyers that they had formerly 
possessed. '' 
It is to be noted that the only change in the lan-
guage of that part of Section 15-8-80, which precedes 
the proviso, made since its original enactment, is the 
dropping from it of the words ''any !private corpora-
tion or'' which, in the original text preceded the word 
"business". The scope of that part of the statute has 
been narrowed, if anything, rather than widened. The 
proviso shows legislative intent to destroy the objec-
tion to license taxes made in the first arm of the Bore-
man decision, that is limitation of the general statute to 
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matter~ covered by specific statute, but the argument 
tnade in the second arn1 of the opinion remains valid. 
For it 'vould s.een1 to be clearly the law that, in such a 
legislatiYe situation, an implication of intent to include 
the legal profession in the scope of the licensing power 
"rill not be indulged in : - express language is neces ... 
sary, and there is in this statute no such express grant 
of power to overcome the effect of the law of this State 
as it existed in 1935. In American Co. v. City of Lake .. 
port, (Cal.) 32 Pac. 2nd 622 it is said on ,pa.ge 629. 
·'But the in1position of a tax by inference or 
implication, no matter how logical or reasonable 
it may seem, is universally condemned by the 
authorities \\7hich lay do\\rn the rule that the tax 
must be based upon express statutory authority, 
and that doubts will be resolved against the tax-
ing po"rer. '' 
See also: 
Cache County vs. Jensen, 21 Utah 207; 61 Pac. 
303. 
Salt Lake City vs. Revene, 101 Utah 504; 124 
Pac. 2nd 537. 
Lent vs. City of Portland, (Ore.) 71 Pac. 645. 
Barnard and Miller vs. Chicago, (Ill.) 147 N.E. 
384; 38 A. L. R. 1533. 
To cite more cases would he a work of superero-
gation. There is nothing in decided authority to the 
contrary. ~rhe rule is fundamental. 
As to (B), - Section 15-8-80, interpreted as prior 
decisions of this Court require, applies only to such 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
:bu~in~~s.es as are within the regulatory power and. as 
. tp· wliich the taxing ordinance contains some effective 
:~~~sU:r.e of. regW..ation. The practice of the law, being 
.~ntir~ly without the scope of municipal regulation, is 
• • • • I 
."Qeyp~d the power of the City to tax. 
· Our argument is based solely upon the decisions of 
'this ·c~urt. We are aware that in such sister states as 
·caiifornia and New Mexico, the latter applying Cali-
fo.rnia rules, decisions to the contrary appear. Nor have 
we ·failed to -consider that in such cases as Salt Lake 
.City vs. Christensen Co., 34 Utah 38, 95 Pac. 523, 17 
.L. R. A. (NS) 898, this Court has reached a result which 
·is contrary to ·the contention here made.- but in such 
cases the rpoint we raised has not been discussed. Sec-
tion 15-8-80 contains as its component parts ·a power 
granted, a means prescribed, a limit on its extent. The 
power is to ''raise r·evenue- and regulate'' the means 
prescribed, are ''by levying and collecting a license fee 
or tax'' and the limitation is ''on any business within 
the limits of the City.'' Section 511, Subd. 11, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1898, a predecessor statute to Sec-
tions 19-5-27, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, granted to 
counties the power ''to license, for purposes of regula-
tion and revenue, all and every kind of business, not pro-
hibited by law, transacted and carried on in such 
county,'' then adding words limiting the power to tax 
shows, ·exhibitions, etc., to those carried on without incor-
porated cities. Here again we have a power granted, 
a means prescribed and a limit on its ·extent. The !POWer 
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granted again 18 to raiSP revenue and regulate, the 
means prescribed is that of a license fee· or tax and 
the limitation is to business • 'carried on in said county'' 
except as noted 'vith respect to shows, exhibitions, ·etc. 
Gramatically speaking, the two statutes, while, having 
a somewhat different arrangement, express identica] 
powers having substantially the same limitations and are 
to be carried on by identical means. We submit that the 
interpretation placed on the statute respecting counties 
applies \Yith full force and effect to the statute here con-
sidered, respecting cities. For that reason th·e case of 
Cache County vs. Jensen (supra) seems to us decisive 
I 
on that point. In that case Cache County under the 
statute granting license powers to counties above-
referred to, passed an ordinance applicable to ''the 
business of raising, grazing, herding, or pasturing of 
sheep'' within that County, fixing license fees on a 
graduated scale based upon the number of sheep owned 
or in possession, making failure to obtain a license· to 
be a misdemeanor, providing for an official person 
whose duty it was to collect the tax, and providing for 
prosecution of actions ·arising therefrom. The Court 
said, among other things : 
''So a right to license a business or occup~ation 
does not imply a right to exact a tax merely for 
revenue, and \vhere the object is revenue, the 
power to license must be conferred in ·unmistak-
able tefms. Cooley Const. Lim. 242". (Ibid, p. 
305.) 
''. . . A municipal corporation, as such, has 
no inherent po,ver to grant licenses or exact 
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license fees; it must derive all of its authority 
in this regard from the state, and the power 
must be taken by direct grant, and cannot be 
taken by implication". (Ibid, p. 306) 
And held that the pov.rers granted by the ordinance 
referred to extended only to the raising revenue from 
businesses which, under it, the County might regulate, 
saying: 
''If the legislature had intended to delegate 
to such boards, through the medium of a license, 
the power to raise revenue without reference to 
regulation, it was within its power to do so in 
unmistakable terms. Any doubt or ambiguity 
arising out of the language must be resolved in 
favor of the public. The power must be the re-
sult of a direct grant, and cannot be ilnplied. 
Such a statute must be construed ·with much 
strictness". (Ibid, p. 306). 
The converse of the argument made in the case of 
Cache County vs. J·ensen arose in the cas-e of Ogden 
City vs. Leo, 54 Utah 55·6, 182 Pac. 530, 5 A. L. R. 960, 
in which, under a statute authorizing cities to "lic-ense, 
tax and regulate'' certain businesses, including eating 
houses, it was contended that the powers granted did 
not ·extend to regulation beyond that necessary to imple-
ment the levy of a occu;pation tax and so did not author-
ize the City to prohibit installation of ·booths in public 
ea~ing and drinking places. This Court held that the 
statute was not subject to such construction, full force 
being required to he given to the word "regulate" so 
used. 
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Our contention then is that, construed as this Court 
construed the statutes provided in the two cas·es last 
above-cited, Seetion 15-8-80 confers a power to raise 
revenue and regulate, and that where there may be no 
regulation there may not be power to raise :revenue, 
so that in effect the statute extends the ~express powers 
of regulation by taxing for such purpose to ·business and 
occupations ,,-ithin the City which may lie within the 
purvie"T of the police powers, and which are not else-
where expressly mentioned, and authorizes such taxation 
to go beyond the limits which a regulation tax alone 
would ~l'ermit, and to invade the field where taxation for 
revenue lies. 
The practice of law, as we have seen, does not lie 
"Tjthin the regulatory field of cities, nor is it subject 
to any such regulation, the State having pre-empted 
by its legislation ·all rights of that ·character over that 
profession. It therefore lies without the scope of Sec-
tion 15-8-80. So construed, the statute is valid. Con-
strued as permitting cities to raise 'revenue and regu-
late the practice of la"v by means of license fee:s or 
taxes, the statute would be \vanting in constitution·ality, 
because the right to license, as distinguished from the 
right to tax, the carrying on of the practice of law, 
without regard to the qualifications of those so taxed, 
is beyond the power of the legislative arm. We might 
add that, while California cases uniformly hold th-at stat-
utes giving the power to raise revenue and regulat~e 
arP to be read as if thP "and" was "and/or", in at 
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least one case that Court, while adhering to the rule~ 
did so on grounds resembling that which justifies appli-
cation of the rule of stare decisis - that is, that it was 
settled law, although probably not good law. See Ex 
Parte Nowak (Cal.) 195 Pac. 402. 
PROPOSITION NO. 2 
Under this heading there is raised the questi9n as 
to whether the practice of la'v is subject to taxation for 
revenue, without any attempt at regulation. In the case 
of Ruckenbrod vs. ~Iullins, 102 Utah 548; 133 Pac. 2nd 
325; 144 A. L. R. 839, this Court has pointed out that 
the authorities are in conflict respecting this matter. 
In Sub-section (A) under Propostion No. 1 of this brief 
we have pointed out that Section 15-8-80, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943 applies only to such businesses as are 
\vithin the regulatory power and that the practice of 
of law does not come within the scope of such municipal 
regulation. \¥" e respectfully submit that the argument 
under that point is applicable to Proposition No. 2. 
PRO~POSITION NO. 3 
Under this heading \Ve argue that the said Ogden 
City ordinances as dra\vll, whatever may be its statu-
tory warrant, is invalid because it is discriminatory, not 
only because it taxes gross earnings of those engaged 
in the professions and other callings, excluding others 
\vho are also earners of incomes, but that it discrimin-
ates among members of tl1e various branches of the 
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professions and callings by taxing those who serve the 
public as a ""hole but excluding those 'vhose service is 
lnnited to those only 'vho pay their fixed and stated 
salaries. 
It 'vill be noted that the tax or license fee is based 
upon income, not"rithstanding the city refers to income 
as gross receipts, so that the classification fixed for 
the purpose of taxing or licensing is based upon persons 
"ith an income rather than upon the nature or kind of 
business, trade or occupation engaged in. As further 
evidence\ that the tax or license is based upon income 
is n1ade apparent in Section 13, 'vhich follovvs the state. 
and federal income tax la,vs, making the information re-
quired upon the return blanks exempt fron1 public in-
spection, etc.; Section 14, which requires the keeping of 
books and records for a period of four years ; and Sec-
tion 18, which again follows the state and federal enact-
ments, permitting the city to determine the amount of 
income of one \Vho fails or neglects to file his return 
and fix the tax or license due thereon ; also gives the 
city the right ·to examine books and records of the sub-
ject to determine the correctness of his report and re-
turn. 
After having classified the persons subject to the 
payment of the tax or license fee, based up,on income, 
the ordinance makes certain exce:ptions therefrom. The 
general classification fixed is found in Section 20, as 
follows: 
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''A.. Business as used in this ordinance 
shall include all activities ·engaged in ·or cau~ed 
to be engaged in with the object of gain or econ-
omic profit," 
which classification, of -course, to that point includes all 
persons with ·an income from any source whatsoever. 
Having made the general classification upon which the 
ta~ or license is based, the city ·seeks to make an excep-
tion therefrom as follows : 
''but shall not include the acts of employees 
rendering service to employers.'' 
In Sub-division B of the same section the act further 
defines ~the words ''engaging in business'' and therein 
includes ''the rendering of personal services for others 
for a consideration by persons engaged in any profes-
sion, trade, craft, business, occupation or other calling." 
(Italics added.) 
The ·act must be considered from the standpoint of 
the inclusion of persons employed for' a consideration 
in any !Prof.e.ssion, trade, craft, business., occupation or 
other calling as against the exclusion of ''the acts of 
employees rendering service to employers'' and as 
against th·e general inclusion of all income earners as 
against the exclusion of ''the ~cts of employees render-
ing service to employers.'' We shall not make the con-
tention that the city or the taxing power may not clas-
sify certain of its inhabitants UJpon which a tax or 
license fee may be impos-ed and that it may not exclude 
other groups from the payment of that tax or license 
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fe·e. The contention is that the segregation or clas·· 
sification of different groups or segments of the popu-
lation for taxing' or license must not be arbitrary 
but must be based up.on reason to satisfy the provisions 
of the federal constitution, which provides. that 
""No state shall make or enforce any law 
\Vhich shall abridge the I>Tivileges Or immunities 
of citizens of the United States . . . nor deny to 
any per~on within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.'' 
Alnendment XIV, Sec. 1, Constitution of 
United States. 
Article 1, Sec. 24, Constitution of lJtah. 
That the provisions of the federal and state con-
stitutions are equally ap:pJicable to the legislative enact-
ments of cities as well as the state is so elementary that 
we think the citation of authorities is not necessary. 
It is the contention of the plaintiff that the inclu-
sion of all income earning groups except ''employees 
rendering service to employers'' in Section A of Section 
20 is arbitrary and discriminatory against and abridges 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States residing within Ogden who are subject to the tax 
and denies unto them the equal protection of the laws. 
The exclusions or exceptions from the provisions of the 
act, of wage earners are, using the language of the act, 
''the acts of employees rendering service to employers'' 
to be a valid exclusion or exception, as previously stated, 
tnust be based upon reason and must not be arbitrary 
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or discriminatory. What, if any, could the reason be' 
It could not be based upon amount of income, because 
it goes without saying that the fellow who runs a boot-
black shop and numerous other small businesses may 
very well have a substantially les~s income than many 
employees, particularly school teachers and executives 
of- corporations, who in many instances are among the 
highest income groups. It cannot be based on the neces-
sity to regulate for the reason that many persons, and 
particularly the professional groups, are not subjects 
of any special or extra regulation by the municipal 
government, to which wage earners ;and salaried groups 
are not also subject. As a matter of fact, the store-
keeper, such as the clothier, the furniture dealer, the 
groceryman, the lawyer, the doctor or dentist, are all 
engaged in legitimate business beneficial to the public 
and community generally. All !professional groups are 
regulated by the state through the Department of Reg-
istration and state courts, whereas the employee of the 
employer who is running a gambling game or illicitly 
selling liquor or drugs or a booking agent for a gam-
bling house and many others who are engaged in im-
moral and illegal practices and subjects of the need for 
great regulation and of great cause for concern to the 
municipality and the public generally, are completely 
exempt from the provisions of the act. It cannot be on 
grounds of protection for the reason that the school-
teacher, who is exempt in the act, has the protection 
of the school building and classroom in which he 
teaches. The tools of his prof.e,ssion or trade are pro-
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vided for him. He has police, fire .and health rp·rotection 
the same as the lawyer, the doctor or the storekeeper. 
Hence, the only basis upon which the classification could 
have been made is based upon the fact that the wage 
earner or salaried person constitutes the majority of 
our residents and hence casts more votes on ·election day. 
It might also be noted that the doctor, the lawyer, 
the dentist and other so-called professional men actually 
earn their income through performing services for 
others. They are employees in a sense as is. the man-
ager, the janitor or other employee of a business. The 
professional man is a specialist in his line. Most em-
ployees are specialists in their line. A salesman is hired 
because he is adept and trained in the selling of goods. 
He is a specialist in the same sense that the doctor or 
lawyer or dentist would be a s:pecialist. The average 
employee receives the same protection as. does the 
average doctor, lawyer or other professional man in 
that the place in which he is employe;d is protected; his 
health and welfare are protected; his place of employ-
ment is protected by the police, fire, street and health 
departments of the municipality. There is no true dif-
ference in the fundamental purpose of an occupation, 
bet'\V ... een a man employed to sell automobiles and an at-
torney employed to protect the rights of an individual 
in a court of law. The attorney has been and is held to 
a greater degree of required proficiency by regulation 
of the state. However, the fact that he is licensed by 
the state and is required to adhere to certain rules and 
regulations of the state does not change the fact in any 
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\Vay that the attorney does receive his compensation 
in the same manner ·as a salesman or any employee re-
ceives compensation and of course for the same purpose 
"gain or profit". We find many lawyers who are em-
ployed on a salary basis by various companies and by 
the 1nunicipal, state and federal governments. Such 
salary V\7ould be exempt under the ordinance. \V e recog-
nize the fact that these attorneys are given the same 
protection. They have their offices in which to work 
and perforn1 services for their employer, and these of-
fices are oftimes not in a building owned or leased or 
rented by the employer but are offices maintained by 
the attorney. He is furnished the same protection as 
are the attorneys ,,~ho are not regularly employed by 
the corporations or governmental departments. There 
is actually no difference betw~en an attorney who works 
full-time for a corporation or a governmental agency 
and one who "\vorks for a period of time for one cor-
poration, then a period of time for another corpora-
tion or employer, be the employer a governmental 
agency, corporate entity or an individual. Indeed, the 
payment of retainer fees has always been considered 
most desirable in the practice of law. The lawyer en-
deavors to be employed regularly by one or more em-
ployers. It is unreasonable and arbitrary to say that 
because an attorney derives his income from a number 
of ernployers that he is in a diff~rent class than the at-
torney who derives his income from one employer. The 
ordinance in question sets up as a class all people re-
ceiving income. Assuming this to be a reasonable classi-
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fication, it certainly becomes unreasonable when fhe 
large portion of the class as a whole are exempt and 
excused from the payment of this license tax because 
they obtain their income in a slightly different manner 
than those "'"ho must pay the tax. We have already 
pointed out that even their manner of earning their in-
come is actually no different than the manner in which 
the professional man obtains his income. We are all 
em}lloyed to do a certain job. The professional man is 
known as a professional man, principally because· he 
is highly regulated and held to a high degree of }Jro-
ficiency by the state. That State regulation and that 
requirement of high proficiency resulting therefrom are 
certainly no basis for discriminating against the pro-
fe-ssional man. 
We can cite hundreds of ·cases, commentaries and 
textbooks on the basic rule that, in order to tax a class, 
the classification must be reasonable and not a mere 
arbitrary distinction, in order that the above referred 
to equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses 
of the federal and state constitutions be complied with. 
In State v. Wright and others, (Ore.) 100 Pac. 
296, the Supreme Court of Oregon stated the following 
on page 298: 
''It is true a state may impose a tax on or 
require a license from persons engaged in cer-
tain callings or trades without being bound to 
include all persons or all property that may be 
legitimately taxed for governmental purposes. 
But the classification must ·be on some reason-
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able basis, and the law, when enacted, tnust apply 
alike to all engaged in the business _or occupa-
tion. *** A statute which directly or by implica-
tion grants special privileges, or imposes special 
burdens upon persons engaged in substantially 
the same business under the same conditions, 
cannot be sound, because it is class legislation 
and an infringement of the equal rights guaran-
teed to all. '' 
In the case above mentioned salesmen of certain 
articles 'vere taxed, and salesmen of other articles were 
exempt from the tax. None of the articles were injurious 
or detrimental in any way. The class involved in that 
case 'vas all salesmen. The class involved in the case 
at bar, as set out by the ordinance, is all income earners. 
The exemptions given in our case were arbitrary in 
viev,r of the fact that there is no essential difference be-
t\veen the compensation earned by a so called employee 
of employers and the compensation earned by an at-
torney, w·ho, is in essence employed by a number of em-
ployers. 
The city ordinance has set out their classification 
and have set out exemptions within this classification. 
These exemptions are discriminatory and based on an 
unsound conception of how attorney or other profes-
sional man obtains his income. 
This Honorable Court in State v. Bayer, 34 Utah, 
257; 97 Pac. 129, found that it was unreasonable to re-
quire a license for peddling of certain articles and ex-
empting peddlers of other articles from any license tax. 
/ 
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The court n1ade the following sta.te1nent on pages 131 
and 132 of the 1pacific citation: 
'• No"' it is apparent that under- the pretense 
of exercising the police power or of adopting a 
revenue measure, the legislature passed the act 
for the 1nere benefit of local and domestic deal-
ers. ****•** We are well satisfied that the act 
has no such relation to the public health or morals 
as will sustain it as a police measure. Nor can 
it, because of its illegal discrimination as to prop-
erty and :persons, be upheld as a revenue meas-
ure. We think it repugnant to the provisions of 
the federal constitution that no state shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States nor to deny to persons within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the la,vs. '' 
It is obvious that the ordinance in question in the 
case at bar is not a police measure. Therefore, if it is 
to be upheld as meeting the requirements of the federal 
constitution, it must be upheld as a revenue measure. 
A case in voint is State v. Parr, reported in 109 
~linn. 147, 123 N. W. 408, 134 Am. St. Rep., 759. In that 
case a legislative enactment sought to tax the occupa-
tion of and to license hawkers, peddlers and transient 
merchants and then defined the occupations and distin-
guished bet,veen so-called transient merchants and so-
called permanent merchants. The Supreme Court of 
~{innesota, looking through the different groups re-
ferred to as hawkers, peddlers and· transient nler-
• 
chants, made this significant statement on page 410 
of N. W.: 
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''The basis of classification is residence with-
in a prescribed division of the state, the imme-
diate effect of which is to protect such resident 
merchants from ·competition from the outside or 
to deny them the privilege of entering more prom-
ising territory than their own and adjacent 
counties. ' ' 
Since the basis of the classification in that case was 
residence within the prescribed division in the state the 
court found that there was a discrimination between 
members or groups of that general classification, and 
that the measure violated the state and federal constitu-
.. 
-tion both as a regulatory measure and as a revenue pro-
ducing measure. The court further said in part on said 
page 410: 
''The legislature is not required to provide 
for the taxation of occupations; but if such a 
course is pursued and any occupation is selected 
for that pu!"ipose, then the burden must fall 
equally upon the members of the class.'' (Italics 
sUJpplied). 
By classifying upon the basis of income earners instead 
of occupation, the principle of discrimination remains 
as effective, and the same result obtains. That principle 
was succinctly stated by this court in State v. Wright, 
supra, in the following language: (page 298) 
''But the classification must be on some 
reasonable basis; and the law, when enacted, 
must apply alike to all engaged in the business 
or occupation.'' 
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In Park City v. Daniels, 46 Utah 554, 149 Pac. 1094, 
this eourt again laid do,vn the rule, page 1095 of pacific 
reporter: 
• 'It is essential, however, to the constitution-
ality of such statutes that the tax apply equally 
to all persons of a given class and is uniform 
and equal. Citing Salt Lake City v. Utah Light, 
etc. Co., 142 Pac. 1067. **** The discriminations 
which are open to objection (lack of uniforn1ity) 
are those where persons are engaged in the same 
business are subject to different restrictions or 
are held entitled to different privileges under 
the same oondi tions. '' 
The State v. Parr case, supra, applies the same rule 
\vhere the basis of classification is broadened to include 
area or locality. It certainly does not require any 
stretching of the imagination to apply the same rule 
to the broader classification of income earners. 
In State v. J. B. and R. E. Walker, Inc., a very 
recent case, reported in 116 Pac. (2), 766, this court, 
speaking through Chief Justice McDonough, s-aid, on 
page 769, Pac. : 
''In :order to see: whether the excluded classes 
or transactions are on a different basis than 
those included, we must look at the purpose of 
the act. The objects and purposes of the law 
:p·resent the touchstone for determining proper 
and improper classifications.'' 
Surely the .purpose of this act is revenue, and the sub-
jects to whom the act applies are income earners, be-
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cause non-income earners would produce no revenue, 
and the exclusions or exemptions ·must be based upon 
some valid constitutional reason other than voting power 
or numbers. The group covered by the general classifi-
cation here and every individual member of the group 
receives his or her income for ·some tangible or intangi~le 
consideration, whether a service or for sale of goods. 
It is, therefore, our contention under the cases cited 
that this ordinance is arbitrary and discriminatory for 
the following reasons : 
1. That certain segments of the general classifi-
cation (income earners) ;are excluded or exempted with-
out any valid reason therefor, because all members of 
the general classification have the same police, fire arid 
health protection. 
2. That there is no legal difference or distinction 
sufficient to form a legal basis for classification be-
tween the income earner who receives all his income 
f-rom one source or many sources. 
3. That there is a discrimination resulting under 
the ordinance in the income of individual members of 
the general classification, that is, income based u1pon a 
fee basis or salary or wage basis. 
4. A discrimination against local residents who 
practice law as against those residing without the. city 
but maintaining offices therein, which would arise if 
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the ordinance be held to apply to residents only. We 
:point out in other sections of this brief that we believe 
the ordinance as dra\vn applies to all members of the 
profession, without respect to residence or place where 
an office is maintained, and there assign our reasons for 
deeming such a tax improper. 
PROPOSITION NO. 4 
That the city is without p·ower to levy gross income 
taxes upon its residents would seem almost to be ;ac-
cepted without argument. For that matter, we are un-
able to see that there exists any distinction between the 
power to levy a tax based upon gross income, as here, 
and one based upon the income remaining after such 
exemptions, deductions, and personal credits as the law 
levying the tax may grant. This ordinance itself makes 
certain such allowances, and is not a tax on all gross 
income, although it omits ~power to deduct from the in-
come taxed most of the items of expense which come 
from income earned before its productiveness as net 
income can be measured. 
The power to levy any occupation tax and, as noted, 
only such a tax could under any reasoning be levied 
upon the practice by a lawyer of his profession, must 
find its basis in some statutory enactment. The legis-
lature of the State of Utah, while providing a system for 
state taxation of incomes, has never seen fit to grant 
such a power to its municipalities. 
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PROPOSITION NO. 5 
Here we raise a question which seems to have been 
absent in litigation concerning the imposition of occupa ... 
tion taxes upon members of the Bar. Perhaps this ques-
tion has not been considered because of the fact that 
the integration of the State· Bar associations and the 
final taking over by jthe Courts of the rule-making power 
and the control of the officers of the Courts including 
lawyers is of comparative recent development. Want 
of po\ver of the legislative authority to interfere with 
the Bar of the Sta·te, particularly where the State 
through ·an organized Bar, subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Courts only and acting under the authority of 
those Courts, controls the profes'sion, has been well pre-
sented to this Court in a recent brief in the case of 
Thatcher et al vs. Industrial Commission et al, now· 
pending before this Court. Because that matter has 
been argued and is in the bosom of this Court we shall 
not be so presumptuous as to repeat at length the argu-
ment there n1ade, however, "re cite the authority, mort~ 
fully discussed in the brief in that case and summarize 
the rules of the la'v therein sitated. The argument sounds 
in the function of the individual la\\ryer as an officer 
of the Court, as well as in the fact that, the judicial 
branch of the Government having taken over jurisdic-
tion over the profession of the practice of la \v, the legis-
lative branch 1nay not impose conditions of any kind 
upon the exercise of his functions by the lawyer. That 
such practice is so intimately bound up with the judicial 
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power that it may not be interfered· with. by other 
branches of the Government is !pOinted out in: 
In re Platz 42 Utah 439; 132 Pac. 390. 
In re Unification of Montana Bar Associa-
tion (l\Iont.) 87 Pac. 2nd 172. 
In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar As-
sociation (Neb.) 275 N. ,V. 265; 114 
A. L. R. 151. 
State ex rel Ralston vs. Turner (Neh.) 4 N. 
W. 2nd 302; 144 A. L. R. 138. 
In re Fletcher, 107 Fed. 2nd 666, Cert. den. 
302 u. s. 664. 
Meunier vs. Bernich (La.) 170 So. 567. 
See Annotation 144 A. L. R. 150. 
We direct attention to those cases which are based 
on the rule that when the judicial authority has ·once 
moved into the field of contr9l of the Bar, and occupied 
it, the legislative activity in that field, although perhaps 
paramount before, ceased to function. See in re Berk-
witzk (Mass.) 80 N. E. 2nd 45. 
We also direct ;attention to the fact that, while, as in 
the case of In re Platz (supra), this Court recognized 
legislative enactments in aid of this Court's jurisdic-
tion over the Bar up to a recent date, when this Court 
adopted its rules in 1937, in these rules this Court in-
corporated statutory provisions so that they might con-
tinue in effect and declared that it adopted these rules 
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under i·ts inherent power to supervise the conduct of 
members of this Bar. 
Whatever might have been the position of this 
Court prior to the integration of the Bar under its 
supervision, the Courts and the Courts alone may now 
say what must be done by a lawyer to enable him to a:p-
pear in any Court in 'this State wheresoever situated 
and wheresoever he may reside or maintain :an office . 
..c\.ny legislative infringement in that field, whether by 
way of license or tax or regulation, has no warrant. 
PROPOSITION NO. 6 
Our Petition sorne,vhat ineptly states the point we 
desire to reach under this division. Our point might 
be stated m,ore aptly as follows : If such an ordinance 
as the one in question, 'vhich taxes not the maintenance 
of a place for transacting legal business but the perform-
ing of any legal business in a community, is lawful, then 
the result will be damaging not only ~to the lawyer but 
to the public, since it will inevitably result in restric-
tions upon the field in which a lawyer can afford to 
practice and so deprive litigants of service by counsel 
whom they would otherwise employ. 
It is the contention of plaintiff that the language of 
the ordinance makes the requiren1ent of obtaining an 
Ogden license incumbent upon every member of the 
legal ~profession who practices his profe·ssion in that 
city, - and this without regard to the maintenance of 
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an office therein. \V' e concede that there are elements 
in thi~ ordinanee \V hich look the other \Yay, -- such as 
the requiren1ent of Seetion 2 that lieenses must be pro-
cured for each place of ·business within the City, and 
the Section following it, \vhich requires separate appli-
cation for each place of business, and also the require-
ment of Section 12 in the placing· of the license on con-
spicuou8 display, ''in the place of business licensed.'' 
But the express language of the ordinance can not Lc-
varied by such rules, which would be applicable either 
to an ordinance \Yhose incidence is equally upon main-
tenance of a ;place or places of business 'vithin the City 
and upon the transacting of business therein. The 
broader scope of the ordinance is shown by the fact that 
the act made unlawful by Section 1 is not the mainten-
ance of a place of business \vithout a license but the 
engaging in business without a license. Engaging in 
business is defined in Section 19 (b) as specifically in-
eluding ''the rendering of personal services for others 
for a consideration by persons engaged in any profes-
sion, trade, craft, business occupation or other calling.'' 
Such language includes the small contractor \vhose of-
fice is "under his hat" just as readily as it includes 
large construction companies with acres of land for 
storage of equipment. It includes the peddler or can-
vasser who sells intangible property by sample as well 
as the de:partment store. A physician who practices his 
e.alling in the hospitals and in the homes of his patients 
may have no place of business "rhere he might display 
his license but 'vould n.evertheless be engaging in his 
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profession within the City. The lawyer who resides and 
maintains his office without the corporate limits of 
Ogden City, possibly in South Ogden or Roy, but 
who necessarily enters the territory of Ogden City to 
appear in the Federal Court or the Courts maintained 
by the State, certainly practices law in Ogden City just 
as definitely as do counsel for litigants in railroad cases 
or counsel representing other large corporations or liti-
gants who customarily employ legal counsel vvithout 
respect to the re'Sidence of such legal 1practitioners. 
If such an ordinance can be sustained, then in view 
of the needs of Utah cities and towns for· additional 
revenue, which need must be a part of the general 
knowledge of public affairs which this Court may con-
sider, it is no idle speculation to say that cities and 
towns generally will enact similar ordinances. Under 
such condition legal counsel from Ogden would be re-
quired to obtain license fr·om and pay fees to Salt Lake 
City for the privilege of -appearing lawfully before this 
C·ourt or the United States District Court sitting in 
Salt Lake City and for the privilege of examining records 
or conferring with State Departments or commissions 
or for the privilege of per.forming the multitude of 
other legal duties which representation of clients now 
impose~s upon the legal1practitioner. 
The lawyer's charges are not ordinarily based upon 
a time schedule but are predicated upon such other fac-
tors as the importance of the matter at hand may dic-
tate. and as the results or the time expended may war-
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rant and a multiplicity of such ordinances would im-
pose upon the la"~yer the impracticable task of assign-
ing to eaeh com1nunity 'vhere he engages in business 
the correct proportion of the fee to be paid by that 
client, - and this with no standards established by 
,vhich he may so assign the results of his labors and 
with the constant danger that he may be found to have 
erred in his computations resulting in his license being 
rescinded and his right to appear before the Courts in 
thi~ or that community taken away. 
Such results are not speculative nor irnprohable 
but are the almost certain results of such taxation of a 
profession which, because it necessarily may include 
"'ide territorial scope, is ordinarily treated by th~ ~ourts 
in such 'vise that by "professional courtesy" even mem-
bers of the Bar from without the state are permitted to 
appear before our Courts in isolated cases without com-
plying with the rules requiring Utah license and Bar 
membership as a condition of the practice of law. 
Such powers of taxation, so exercised, might well 
limit the activities of members of the legal 1profession 
to the places of their residence. No matter how small 
the tax per county seat, the burden of reports, of in--
quisitorial visitations by the recorders forces, of book-
keeping and similar other extra legal activities imposed 
by such an ordinance, would 1put into effect a law of 
diminishing returns from extension of business area. 
But, a point which perhaps might have been made 
under our Proposition No. 1, we think the ordinance 
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is invalid not only on reason but because, in its at-
tempt to tax those who merely engage occasionally or 
casually in the practice of law· in Ogden City, main-
taining no regular place of business there, the City 
Commission of Ogden has clearly overstepped any 
right it might have under the pertinent legislative 
enactment. It appears obvious to us that when the 
legislature granted to cities the right to levy a license 
fee or tax ''on any business within the limits of the 
city" it certainly did not contemplate that the fugitive 
appearances of lawyers from without the city who main-
tain no place of business within the City should be sub-
ject to such tax. 
We know that occupation ·taxes have been sus-
tained on so-called '' tran_sient'' busine'Ss·es, such as those 
who peddle from door to door as well as those with 
fixed places of abode such as auctioneers who conduct 
sales for only short periods, but those so taxed have some 
locus of busine·ss where they carry on their callings, 
- a store of some sort or a wagon or other vehicle upon 
the street. There is something to which the license may 
be affixed, where it may be "kept on cons:picuous dis-
play,'' as this ordinance requires, if only the case or 
box in which the peddler carries his ~samples. The lawyer 
has no such place , of business when he comes to such 
city. He may be there to read a record or to talk with a 
witness or to speak before a court or to try a case 
pending before the court. His equipment is in his head; 
he is not there to sell~something but to serve some cause. 
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It appears to us that these considerations are suf-
ficient to condemn this ordinance as overreaching, -
through its a ttetupt to brand as taxable such .acts as 
the la,vyer may perforn1 as a part of the general exer-
cise of his profession in appearing before the Courts 
or doing other tasks of an investigatory character in 
counties or cities other than the location of his office. 
Certainly the lawyer located at Murray who tries a 
case in the only places where the Third Judicial District 
Courts sit is not attempting to ''engage in business'' in 
Salt Lake City. He merely performs a function incident 
to his duties as an officer of the courts of justice which 
had their inception in that place where his office is 
located. 
In a sense, this question is not new, for a multitude 
of cases may be found dealing with transient business, 
such as grazers who rent lands or use ·a public do1nain 
for herding their flocks or the many forms ·of businesses 
which men may do in places other than those of their 
residence. But where such taxes are permitted to be 
levied upon him who enters the place without intention 
of permanency of business there is some badge of lo-
cation, Home property brought to be used. Search of 
the digests and texts has failed to indicate a case where 
an occupation tax, levied upon the ''rendering of some 
personal service for a consideration,'' not accompanied 
\Vith local possession of property used in a business, 
or with some location where the business might have a 
locus given it, has been considered an object of taxation, 
PXcept by Ogden City, 
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Ogden City, if it may lawfully tax those maintain-
ing law offices within its limits, otherwise does not 
lose the right to do so merely because it does not seek 
to reach pra~titioners of the law from other cities. See 
Evers vs. Mayfield (Ky.) 85 S~ W. 697. 
We respecfully submit to the Court that the Alter-
native Writ of Prohibition issued by the Court in this 
matter should be made permanent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DERRAH B. VAN DYKE, 
STEW ART P. DOBBS, 
IRA A. HUGGINS, 
LLEWELLYN 0. THOMAS, 
.Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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